SOME PROBLEMS OF WAR PROPAGANDA

A NOTE ON PROPAGANDA NEW AND OLD

BY ERNST KRIS (NEW YORK)

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I. The Distrusts of Propaganda

Discussions of propaganda in this world crisis tend to be highly practical; they usually culminate in recommendations on how to propagandize. Without adopting the pretense of detachment, to which I have no claim, I shall attempt in this paper to widen the scope of the discussion by reporting on two concepts of propaganda upon which, explicitly or implicitly, I believe propaganda practices are based. These two concepts are to some extent opposed to each other; they coincide largely with two systems of government, if those systems are taken as 'ideal types' (Max Weber), and with two doctrines of men. Antitheses like democratic and totalitarian propaganda, good and bad propaganda, have been used to describe them. Another antithesis may be even more telling: the psychological hypotheses underlying the concepts here discussed are different in their relation to modern psychological insight, the one being based on an average psychology, the other on what more recent findings suggest. We may therefore speak of propaganda, old and new.¹

Without discussing the definition of propaganda, I here use the term in the widest sense of communication from authority and start with the assumption that in every society some means

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¹ Cf. The University of Chicago Round Table (March 1, 1942) on Propaganda Good and Bad, in which Archibald MacLeish, Harold Lasswell and Richard MacKeon participated. (The University of Chicago Round Table, No. 207, with bibliography.)—The views expressed in the following pages partly supplement a trend of thought first developed in an article on The Danger of Propaganda in Amer. Imago, II, 1941, p. 1, ff.
of social control of this nature exist, which establish contact between the responsible leaders and the community. The scope of such communication is largely determined by the situation in which the group lives, by the reality it has to face. The situation of 'being at war' is one which tends to stigmatize all such communication. Men of all ages, Thucydides, Dr. Johnson, John Dewey, have stressed the high degree of uniformity of all war propaganda, of the theme 'Our cause is right, we will win' echoed throughout time. Thus modern war propaganda was compared to the battle cry of yore, which was meant to encourage one's own group, frighten the foe, and impress those who did not participate in the fight. A similar division of the functions of modern war propaganda is in fact widely accepted. We distinguish propaganda in war time directed to the home front, to the enemy, and to neutrals. In the following pages reference is made only to the first—home propaganda. In the war of 1914–1918 it was successful. Waves of enthusiasm and hatred were aroused, and swayed even those who before the outbreak of war had championed other and higher ideals. The phenomenon was not limited to one nation; it happened in all belligerent countries.

In this war all seems different: propaganda has not been able to 'do the job.' The crisis of propaganda is one common to Western civilization, which in this case includes our European enemies. (No statements on conditions in Russia, China or Japan are possible at present.) All forecasts made before the war were proved false—men went to war in sadness and in silence, not only in the democracies but even in the totalitarian states.

The course of the war has not decidedly affected the picture. The belligerent governments continue to be faced by the distrust of propaganda existing among their people. It is to some extent independent of the form of government. It is not limited to countries where mass communication is monopolized, planned, and linked to coercion. It exists in the democracies, where free enterprise in mass communication prevails, where only the outgoing military news is controlled, where
there is no relationship between communication and coercion. This leads to the quest for the origin of this distrust. It may tentatively be related to two phenomena, here isolated for the purpose of analysis: the disappointment in government and the inflation of persuasion. Both developed fully after the last war, at different times in each of the countries of our civilization. The first, the disappointment in government, is related to the feeling that the world has grown out of control. It is a phenomenon apparently typical of industrialized mass society under the impact of war and postwar conflicts. It is connected with the weakening of religious and other traditional values and with a diffidence to the ideals of progress. The economic crisis in all countries, though at different times and with different intensity, has heightened the disappointment in government into a feeling of general insecurity.  

The reaction to this disappointment has taken various forms. One reaction—known in the development of the child after the discovery that ‘parents are human’—is the search for new ideals and new ‘imagines’. The manipulation of this disposition by reactionaries who financed and by militarists who supported demagogues, has contributed to the rise of dictatorships in Europe. No such successful manipulation occurred in the democracies, protected by greater wealth and by a greater adaptability of government rooted in tradition. In the democracies, too, demagogues—those who did not make demands for sacrifice—had their chance; hence the success of irresponsible government, of Tory appeasers in Britain, and of isolationists in the United States.

The distinction between the general disappointment in government and the reaction to the inflation of persuasion is, we

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said, artificial. The term inflation of persuasion indicates the increase in publicity which during and after the last war swayed the world. Two of the three media of mass communication were introduced in these decades—radio and film—and the impact of publicity on life has grown from year to year. In the United States, where research has provided reliable data, distrust, so far as we know, is not essentially a distrust of commercial advertising. It applies to the relation of the average American to persuasion in politics; even when more than three fourths of the media of communication supported one candidate, this did not change the results of the election.

The Western world is propaganda conscious. In the democracies this was initiated after the last war, when members of the propaganda committees wrote their memoirs, described ‘how it all was done’ and how they swayed their people. This was followed by the consumer movement and the antipropaganda drive. The latest of the attempts at debunking is still fresh in memory: the propaganda phobia which pretended to inoculate the public by teaching them to analyze not the content of statements but the ‘intention’ of those who made them.

The sequence of reactions was different in Germany. The distrust of propaganda was canalized soon after the war by the slogan of the broken promises of Versailles. It was turned against democratic propaganda and finally democratic government. Under the National Socialist regime the distribution of trust and distrust was at first related to political allegiance; later, especially after the outbreak of war, distrust and apathy became very general phenomena. Many independent observers

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4 Persuasion in this sense describes psychological techniques without reference to the social context. For a psychoanalytic discussion of general problems of persuasion in relation to propaganda see: Zilboorg, Gregory: Propaganda from Within. The Annals of the Amer. Academy of Political and Social Science, 1938. Since I recently discussed my own views on this subject at some length (The Danger of Propaganda, loc. cit.), I do not here refer to this problem area.
agree that few people read the papers, listen to the radio, or go to the movies before the news reel is over.\textsuperscript{6}

In both totalitarian and democratic countries measures were adopted or recommended to deal with this situation. Here our problem crystallizes: what were these methods and on what general psychological assumptions were they based? While we cannot here discuss whether or to what extent the views of our enemies have changed since the outbreak of the war, a brief case study will show how they attempted to adapt their techniques to the existence of distrust.

The views expounded in the democracies are not homogeneous. Everybody agrees that truth should prevail. Beyond this, difference of opinion exists. There are two extremist groups: those who stand for intensification of propaganda, for the use of all devices of publicity and advertising in order to create enthusiasm—the radicals among them state that the methods adopted by the Nazis are the best possible. This group of experts professes not only an absolute trust in the various promotional activities; they also advocate in propaganda directed to the enemy a most aggressive and violent attitude.\textsuperscript{7} And then there are those who refuse to give any credit to propaganda. The community, they say, will be united if existing grievances are eliminated. Then, they seem to assume, there will be no need for propaganda.\textsuperscript{8}

Apart from these extremists, a vast body of opinion advocates a new type of propaganda. Its principles are not yet well established, the consequences of the new approach are not yet clearly visible, but the attempt exists; a propaganda

\textsuperscript{6} Cf. Kris, Ernst: \textit{Morale in Germany}, Amer. J. of Sociology XXII, No. 3. In this paper, written in June, 1941, some of the more recent lines of German propaganda were predicted.

\textsuperscript{7} The unconscious meaning of this point of view was revealed to me in the analysis of a professional propagandist, broadcasting to one of the enemy countries: words have become magic weapons, speech is supposed to kill. Phylogenetically this leads back to the origin of the battle cry; ontogenetically this 'aggressivization' of speech was related to oral fantasies.

based on the ‘strategy of truth’, to quote Mr. MacLeish on ‘Facts and Figures’, and integrated into the process of democracy at work. Thus a new and an old concept of propaganda oppose each other. While in reality the differences may frequently be blurred by the demands of a given situation, the problem is clarified if the comparison is extended to that of psychological concepts.

2. Hypnotism and Gustave Le Bon’s Theory of Propaganda

The competence of psychoanalysts to comment on this problem of social technique is well founded in the history of the subject. The concepts upon which the old type of propaganda is based, and which found expression in the propaganda of the first World War and more generally in the inflation of persuasion, are closely linked to pre-Freudian psychopathology. Social psychology at the end of the past century stood under the shadow of the great newcomer to the science of man, hypnotism. The effect of the admittance of this neophyte on the development of psychopathology recently has been described. Its influence on social psychology is as yet not always realized. The later works of Hippolyte Taine are linked with those of the Italian pupil of Lombroso, Sighele, with the great and frequently misinterpreted concepts of Tarde, and finally with the work of Gustave Le Bon, whose Psychology of the Crowd was first published in 1895. The central problem in the work of these men was the transformation of the individual into a member of the crowd, i.e., what we today know to be one aspect of regression. The model of this behavior is found in the dynamics of the hypnotic situation.

The doctrine gained popularity in Le Bon’s presentation. It is one in which the emphasis is shifted from science to politics: the fact that the crowd is easily influenced by the hypnotist and leader may be used for purposes of control—the leader


may manage the crowd. Le Bon's Psychology of the Crowd was, in his own words, written as a re-edited Machiavelli. Born in 1841, the author was one of those French reactionaries who had seen revolutions in plenty. He was terrified by the specter of socialism. His life—a peculiar sequence of endeavors on the fringe between journalism and science—was intrinsically devoted to warding off this peril. A physician by training, he started as a physical anthropologist. He returned from India imbued with the idea of the danger to the white race. What he wrote in the eighties against extending European education to the colored was repeated fifty years later by Oswald Spengler.

In Eastern Europe, this pupil of Gobineau learned to hate the Jews. In his own country he opposed the forty-eight hour week, the abolition of child labor, the expansion of education to the lower-income groups. In the eighties Le Bon won fame by a detailed study of the training of horses, written for the use of the French cavalry. The subject, he said, taught him much which was applicable to human affairs.11

This is the atmosphere out of which grew the Psychology of the Crowd, the first treatise on psychological management in the modern sense. It is written with considerable psychological acumen and with complete cynicism. The mental life of crowds is, according to Le Bon, on the level of hallucination, dominated by images; all ideas presented to the crowd merge into such images, and there is a craving in the crowd for a steady supply of ideas: the illusions. Leaders have to create the illusions as means of domination. (It may be worth recalling that the Bible is to Le Bon a textbook of managerial con-

11 Here is the bridge to the doctrine of conditioning. The impact of this theory on that of propaganda and advertising, though considerable, will not here be discussed. Dr. Ley, the leader of the National Socialist Labor Front, in describing the training and selection of the party elite, says: 'We want to know whether these men have the will to lead, to be masters, in one word, to rule . . . we want to rule and enjoy it . . . we shall teach these men to ride horseback . . . in order to give them the feeling of absolute domination over a living being.' (Ley: Der Weg zur Ordensburg. Sonderdruck des Reichsorganisationsleiter der NSDAP; quoted by Heiden, Konrad: One Man Against Europe. New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1937, and Fromm, Erich: Escape from Freedom. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1941.)
trol, full of obscene absurdities—and much of what he says in this connection might well be quoted as from Rosenberg.)

The student of the history of ideas will note in Le Bon the parallel with Nietzsche and the reaction to Marx, but he will also be able to quote chapter and verse in order to prove how closely statement after statement by Le Bon reappears in the concepts of propaganda developed by Hitler and Goebbels.12

The success of Le Bon’s writings, especially of his Psychology of the Crowd, was largely dependent on a public of specific occupation: translations, except into English and German, were sponsored by Grand Dukes, Ministers of Justice and General Staffs. His biography was written by a Japanese Foreign Minister. When Mussolini came to power he professed the influence of Le Bon’s doctrine. Le Bon, almost ninety years of age, became the admirer of the ‘new order’ in Italy. His closest contacts in France were members of the military elite.

The contamination of science with politics does not negate the truth of a doctrine. The content of truth in Le Bon’s analysis of social events is considerable if limited to its object of investigation. He has described, in terms of his generation, the psychology of mob formation, of man under the spell of a temporary regression. He has erred in extending the concept to human group behavior at large; the crowd to him has become mankind.

The function of propaganda in Le Bon’s scheme is clearly outlined. Its model is the address of the orator; its function is to drive the crowd into submission and to promote its regression. If one rereads how Hitler, with the experience of the agitator of genius, has elaborated these thoughts—age-old thoughts of the demagogue—one will find that the attack upon reason under various disguises is paramount: let the audience

12 This influence, direct or indirect—i.e., conveyed by some of Le Bon’s vulgarizations—gains in significance if we hear that years after the publication of the Psychology of The Crowd, in one of the many books which reiterate the basic thesis of the managerial control of the masses, Le Bon developed in his Psychologie de la politique (1910) a blueprint of fascism; shopkeepers and militias were entrusted with social defense since the upper classes of France had refused to see the danger.
be tired, the lesson be repetitive, then all depends on the propagandist’s conviction. The essence of National Socialist propaganda before and throughout this war has been to reconstitute on a nation-wide scale the conditions of the assembly place, and on a world-wide scale conditions approximating it. The strategy adopted, the tactics used, and the devices so ingeniously varied have one common goal: ultimately to establish between the propagandist and his audience a relationship akin to that between the hypnotist and his medium.

3. Some Comments on Prestige, Prophecy and Initiative in German War Propaganda

German home propaganda consists to some extent of repetitions and variations of Hitler’s own views. Each of his speeches is a blueprint of propaganda. Before each speech some of the themes come up, then he summarizes them, and then the radio waves carry the message daily and with due variation. The main lines of propaganda are under his authority.

The image of this authority, however, has undergone changes. As long as he was not independent of his industrialist and militarist promoters, he was a brother figure—a savior. After that time the build-up of omnipotence started. The pathway was that of success: every success was hinted at so that when achieved it could be represented as a fulfilled prediction. Thus each of the fateful steps—the German rearment, the march into the Rhineland, etc.—was described in terms of an achieved goal. In wartime the manipulation of predictions naturally is handled with the greatest care; planning and preparation, omniscience and foresight, are daily enacted. Studies conducted at the Research Project on Totalitarian Communication illustrate this point. The analysis of words indicating

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13 The following is based mainly on material provided by the Research Project on Totalitarian Communication, directed by Hans Speier and myself. The material analyzed is contained in the Daily Digest of Foreign Broadcasts, published as a confidential document on behalf of the British Ministry of Information by the British Broadcasting Corporation and released by courtesy of the B.B.C. for research purposes to the Research Project on Totalitarian Communication, at the New School for Social Research.
foresight and planning, the essential qualities of magic leadership, in German High Command communiques, show that reports on and reference to military success gradually take the place of such words. A technique of ‘Let the facts speak for themselves’ becomes the substitute for other means of prestige building. It is this publicity technique which helped to create the impression of irresistible and supreme, omnipotent organization.\textsuperscript{14}

Another study, the results of which may here briefly be summarized, deals with the use made of predictions of German actions in their radio home news bulletins. A first finding shows that predictions are generally frequent before action. Without specifying what concrete events are to happen, they create a situation in which success of action will reflect upon the wisdom of the predictor. Such, for instance, was the situation in the spring of 1940, before the campaign in Norway, the Low Countries, and France. After victory less manipulation was thought to be required. At—that time distrust was allayed by conquest.

Predictions increased, however, later in the year and early in 1941, when the Battle of Britain was lost. Not all predictions at that time were fulfilled. A crisis of the technique became apparent in the Russian campaign. A host of predictions accompanied initial successes and when late in the autumn of 1942 the failure became evident, a new device was adopted—that of ‘negative predictions’. Not action, but the failure to act was forecast. In this sense, Herr Hitler’s announcement of November 29, 1941, in which he proclaimed that from now on the German Army would renounce the offensive in Russia, is unique in military history. It is, however, in line with the psychological technique here described. Prediction is the implement of omnipotence and thus of initiative. Passivity is identical with or even more dangerous than

\textsuperscript{14} As an illustration of this technique, the following well-documented device may here be recorded. In a German town eggs have arrived. They are \textit{not} distributed; rather it is announced that in three weeks at four o’clock, two eggs per head will be available.
temporary failure. Thus while the German Army was harassed by the cold and by an undaunted enemy, and while the people at home went through hardships of unexpected severity, in this war’s third winter, the grim news was advertised. Plight and sacrifice were as repetitiously discussed as planning and success in more fortunate times. While here, as in all similar cases, various psychological appeals were carefully blended, one device was outstanding. In discussing the bad news the appearance of frankness was given, and a ‘we can take you into our confidence’ technique was adopted whenever possible. In this sense activity remained with the leader.\footnote{Finally in January, 1942, the traditional history of Hitler’s career was rewritten. Instead of an irresistible rise to power, it became the history of success painfully interrupted by set-backs. For the first time Hitler’s own personality was measured against one of German history. A new film of Frederick of Prussia’s life was hastily arranged, and all official comments stressed the historical parallelism. Here, too, there was victory in spite of set-backs—and the conquest of destiny by endurance was added to the paternalistic equipment.}

This survey naturally is misleading by its very brevity, since it does not discuss how the manipulation of trust in the deified leader is supplemented by the manipulation of distrust against information coming from enemy countries. While we cannot in detail scrutinize what evidence there is of failure or success of the National Socialist propaganda management of the German people, there are indications that it fails when its roots are shaken; i.e., when success, even though temporarily, recedes. In the winter of 1941–1942 the broadcast day of the German radio had to be reorganized; light music was given preference over all other programs. In order to attract the attention of a propaganda-weary audience, propaganda was sandwiched between entertainment programs. In those days of intense cold, spring was described by propagandists as the time when special announcements of victories would be broadcast once more. When later in the spring of 1942 the German offensive in Russia started and the Russians retreated, German propagandists were busily attempting to reëstablish the older pattern. Every suitable quotation from Hitler’s speeches was produced
in order to show that he had predicted that the Russian winter offensive would fail and the German spring offensive succeed. Thus German propaganda was directed toward recuperating the prestige lost throughout the winter. Not the present, not the future—the past was of paramount importance.

Only when seen as part of the National Socialist concept of propaganda, based as it is on the model of the hypnotic situation, can this policy fully be appreciated. The propagandist who wishes to address a spellbound audience cannot afford any gap in his record. Complete success and complete submission are closely linked to each other.\textsuperscript{16}

In turning now for a moment to democratic propaganda under similar conditions, the differences are obvious. The democracies, unfortunately, had in this war more occasion to justify failure to their people than totalitarian states. There are certain patterns of justification which are ubiquitous. Victorious enemy forces generally are described as superior in numbers, the gallantry of defeated troops generally is stressed, the tendency to distract attention from the theater of war where defeat was suffered to other theaters where one’s own forces were successful is equally general. At first sight one might well be inclined to say that differences between totalitarian and democratic communication are in this respect differences of degree only. This, however, is only a first impression, on the whole misleading, which is corrected by experience provided by every further month of war.

At no time in the democracies did criticism vanish. But while in the first year of the war mainly the French and also to some extent the British Government covered their news and propaganda policy with the mantle of secrecy, in Britain the sequence of defeats gave more and more importance to the

\textsuperscript{16} In a survey of German propaganda throughout the war, Dr. Goebbels stated of late that only once was a prediction wrong: in the autumn of 1941, when the Russians were underestimated. It is significant also that in the campaigns of 1942, German propagandists were explicitly instructed to refrain from any prediction. A second failure might be fatal and seriously endanger the concept of paternalistic omnipotence.
criticism of government by parliamentary institutions and public opinion; later the compensatory patterns such as ‘the numerical superiority of the victorious enemy’ were dropped—we refer to the discussion of the British defeat in North Africa in spring, 1942—and concerns for home morale no longer reduced the bluntness and vehemence of criticism. In ever increasing measures detailed information is given, limited only by the requirements of military secrecy, and nonmilitary experts participate increasingly in what the people are being told.

Thus, while defeat in the totalitarian system leads to a crisis, in the democracies it led to a process of gradual adjustment of paternalism and participation.17

4. The New Propaganda

The methods used in order to influence public opinion are closely linked to the system of government. The concept which totalitarians have in mind is that of the people as the crowd which follows the leader; that prevailing in the democracies refers to integrated groups.18 For more than thirty years the discussion of similar problems has played a decisive part in social psychology. It started out from the criticism of Le Bon’s work and the confusion created by his extension of the crowd concept to any kind of community. Freud’s contribution in this connection was rarely, if ever, fully taken into account although it facilitates greatly a clearer formulation of certain psychological aspects of that difference.19

17 This process of adjustment accounts to my mind for organizational failures such as those much discussed by the British Ministry of Information and the Information Services in Washington. Out of trial and error the new patterns develop. The importance of free controversy for morale was discussed by French, Thomas M.: Social Conflict and Psychic Conflict, Amer. J. of Sociology, XLIV, 1938–1939.


19 In Freud’s presentation this formulation is implied and only part of it is explicitly stated.
chology and Analysis of the Ego was not written as a treatise in social psychology. Problems are only discussed so far as they contribute to his main objective, to clarify further the structural model of the personality which he was developing at the time. The main conceptual tool used is that of identification. To the best of my knowledge, no satisfactory attempt has as yet been made to exhaust fully the catalogue of problems to which Freud refers when discussing 'further problems and lines of work'. They include the study of motivation and origins of group formation, of the differences between types of groups according to types of leadership, of the unifying function which common interests, wishes, and ideals may have.

In order to apply Freud's basic concept to our specific problem, I should like to elaborate on a model frequently used by him. I refer to the construct on the origin of ritual and social communication. In a schematic form it permits us to describe changes of function of both leadership and communication, as a change of mechanism used in participation.

On a first level, that of tribal dance, the reaction of the group to the communication of the leader is total: they act together. Individual differences on this level are of little importance. Action, however, is not always essential. In rituals of communication, such as the holy mass, where the leader functions not as the supreme authority but rather as a representative of the supreme ideal, actions are reduced to symbols—but instead, a rigid code prescribes the emotional reaction members of the group are expected or required to have.

A different level is reached where the ritual is gradually secularized and the leader develops from priest to bard or poet. The conformity of reaction then vanishes. The message may mean something different to each member of the group—according to his individual experience. While on the level previously discussed the unity of response was institutionalized, here response is free, only the stimulus is common to all.

Differences in reaction develop gradually into differences in evaluation and in agreement. On this level criticism comes into play. Criticism, however, presupposes a new type of identification: one in which the critic identifies himself with the criticized, to however small an extent, in adopting an attitude of ‘I in his place . . .’. Such criticism may bear on the content of the message or on the way it is presented; it may be rough and unreasonable, or it may be that of the expert. It does not necessarily destroy the fascination which the message may inspire. It introduces, however, a process of testing and of scrutiny as a new element. Some psychological aspects of this process are apparently most accessible to analysis if we turn to the appreciation of art. The response of the audience is an æsthetic one if to a slight degree the audience identifies itself with the artist as creator of the work of art. Only if such an even distant approach to connoisseurship is realized, the æsthetic illusion is maintained and is achieved in what Coleridge calls ‘the willing suspense of disbelief’.

In reformulating these types of participation in terms of processes of identification, two main cases may here be distinguished: one in which the leader and communicator is ‘accepted as ego ideal’—we may here speak of ‘identification in the superego’—the case of the ritual dance; and one in which identification in the superego is supplemented by ego identification . . . this case is linked to what we described as the birth of criticism.

The two concepts of propaganda, the totalitarian and the democratic, easily can be related to this differentiation: totalitarian propaganda clearly is based on the assumption that the message of the leader should be fully ‘accepted as ego ideal’. Identification should take place in the superego. Democratic


22 The case represented by rituals of communication might be described as one in which a ‘partial’ superego identification with the communicator takes place, while the ‘total’ identification concerns the ideal shared by both communicator and audience.
propaganda, on the contrary, is based on a concept in which two types of identification, identification in the superego and in the ego, are more evenly distributed.

So general a formulation clearly describes ideal types of attitudes. In the social reality we may expect to find more complex pictures which require more refined concepts. In the present context devoted rather to preliminary clarification than to a detailed analysis, we may well stress the outstanding contrasts. Totalitarian propaganda, we said, aims at establishing conditions approximating the market place. This was more than a metaphor. If one of the totalitarian leaders addresses his people, he regularly speaks from a mass meeting—and the nation as a radio audience is made to participate in it. They hear how the meeting assembles, they hear the music, they wait in tension, and when the leader appears and while he speaks, they are made to watch the carefully staged reaction of the multitude of which they are made to be a part. Thus the organized spell of the crowd extends to the radio homes. This, then, is the situation which creates the conditions under which the submissive type of identification grows. It grows where individuals have renounced their intellectual and moral independence, where regression rules.

Democratic leaders speak from their study. They address the individuals in their nation, their speeches are 'fireside chats', from one home to another. Not a difference of prestige or power, but one of responsibility exists between the speaker and the listener who is left to weigh, to test, and to consider. Attempts to sway his judgment are rare.

This clearly does not mean that there are no Germans who, in listening to Hitler, can resist his spell. There are many, we know; nor does it mean that we are not touched, although we may guard it as a secret, when we listen to those legitimately speaking for our cause. Rationality does not determine the life of the free; they, too, are subject to enthusiasm of various kinds, and normally so. We all know that we are suggestible and, while we are aware of it, many of us let ourselves for a time be carried away.
The antithesis of regression and ego control, of irrational and rational behavior, is a dangerous simplification. No such exclusion exists. To put it in the negative: he who cannot pro tempore relax, let loose the reins and indulge in regression, is according to generally accepted clinical standards ill. Regression is not always opposed to ego control; it can take place, as it were, in the service of the ego.23

We started our discussion with remarks on distrust and disappointment; we may refer to them now. Many observers have complained about the fact that enthusiasm in this war seems to be suspect in the democracies. Spy fever or hate campaigns are rejected by the people—even by those who, like the British, have gone through the ordeal of total war. They want victory; they do not want orgies of hate.

Thus, based on the experience of the last war, they strive for more and more reasonable apprehension, for more and better information; and have, by their very attitude, created an atmosphere in which the new propaganda may grow. It will, I believe, by later historians be classified as the third revolution in psychological techniques to occur within half a century. And seen together the three revolutions are one. First came the new psychotherapy; the new education followed; the new propaganda is about to emerge.

The essence of the revolution in psychotherapy is well known to us. The command of the hypnotist was replaced by the guidance of the psychoanalyst. We do not in psychoanalysis renounce all elements of suggestion, but they are reduced to a minimum. Some trust and confidence of the analysand is a precondition. The ultimate therapeutic aim is, however, increased self-awareness and increased ego control. It is

23 In a paper read at the International Congress in Lucerne, 1934. I tried to establish this as one of the assumptions necessary to explain human reaction to the manipulation of symbols—in art or social control. Cf. Kris, Ernest: The Psychology of Caricature. Int. J. Psa. XVII, No. 3. 1936. Cf. also Hartmann, Heinz: Ich-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXIV, 1939; and Psychoanalysis and the Concept of Health. Int. J. Psa. XX, 1939. The clinical aspects of the problems discussed here were of late mentioned in various papers by Otto Fenichel.
achieved in the ideal case by lifting the veil of infantile amnesia and thus replacing the compelling forces of fixations by newly and freely made decisions; it is in this sense that Freud termed psychoanalytic therapy reéducation.

The new education was born out of many impulses. The one which came from Freud undoubtedly was decisive. Authoritarian was replaced by coöperative education; automatic obedience, the repercussions of which had become known, by agreement based on understanding. Again authority was not discarded—where it was, it had soon to be reintroduced—but it was modified in its function.

It was and is a painful revolution. It was easier and quicker to cure by hypnosis; but what cures there were, were no longer satisfactory. The scope of therapy had grown. It was easier to educate by stern command, but the results did not meet any longer with general approval; the necessity for more and better guidance had become obvious in the ever-expanding complexity of our lives.

It is now similar to what here is termed the new propaganda. It does not require less; it requires more labor. Again guidance cannot be discarded; it has to be reoriented. Talking down or inciting will no longer do. The task is to explain. H. D. Lasswell, one of its advocates, has lately stressed what he calls balanced presentation—a presentation which states alternatives and thus enables independent evaluation of facts.24 Were this principle fully adopted, an agreement would have been reached on the essentially educational function of the new propaganda: to make his social and physical universe understood by man. This is a task so great, so necessarily integrated with the dynamic process of expanding democracy, that an increase of graded communication beyond all precedent seems warranted. The traditional channels hardly will suffice, and a new per-

sonnel will be required. Training may gradually fill the gap, but at least initially the job to be done is more general. It is clearly one for the opinion leaders, for the educational elite.

If we return for a moment to the model of participation we studied we may now say that what we described as the place of expertness and connoisseurship in the growth of criticism illustrates the function of a democratic elite. Their function as intermediaries between the communication emanating from a representative leadership and the people, may be said to represent the equivalent of their educational status. Their function is essential and irreplaceable—and may well be clarified by reference to its opposite. 'Opinion leaders' in totalitarian countries are the elite of the party, the supervisors of the people, the specialists in violence. They organize totalitarian life with its sham participation, its parades and marches. In their hands, propaganda becomes a supplement of violence, and violence a prerequisite of propaganda. And thus psychological management supplants guidance of public opinion.

In the democracies, on the other hand, the new propaganda, in agreement and sooner or later in coöperation with the other newly developed psychological techniques, aims at individuals of higher freedom and greater responsibility. It is that aim which, for the psychoanalytic therapy, Freud formulates in saying: 'Where id was, ego shall be'.

The oldest meaning of the word propaganda encourages so utopian a view. A moral philosopher of the third century A.D., who wrote under the name of Cato, said:

\[ \text{Disce, sed a doctis, indoctos ipse do \textit{et to}} \]

\[ \text{Propaganda etenim est rerum bonarum doctrina.} \]